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I. INTRODUCTION 
Originalism perseveres, and it is becoming increasingly 
dangerous.  The doctrine of originalism,1 in its strong or pure 
 
       †   Professor of Political Science, Bradley University, Peoria, Illinois.  Ph.D., 
University of Minnesota. 
 1. The term “originalism” is credited to Paul Brest.  Earl M. Maltz, The 
Failure of Attacks on Constitutional Originalism, 4 CONST. COMMENT.  43, 43 n.1 
(1987) (pointing out that “originalism” was first used in Paul Brest, Misguided Quest 
for the Original Understanding,  60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980)).  Earlier discussions 
1
Lermack: The Constitution Is the Social Contract So It Must Be a Contract
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007
5. LERMACK - RC.DOC 4/23/2007  10:52:09 AM 
1404 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:4 
form, maintains that judges have no power to interpret the United 
States Constitution except in accordance with the substantive intent 
of the people who created it at the end of the eighteenth century.2  
Although many scholars have little respect for the doctrine of 
originalism, it retains a hold on the legal and general public. 
The notion of limiting a court’s power to the principles 
accepted long ago resonates with the general public and it 
legitimizes court rulings.3  Distinguished law professor Earl Maltz 
observed that “the concepts embodied in originalism rather plainly 
reflect views on the nature of judging which have a strong intuitive 
 
sometimes used the terms “interpretivism” or “intentionalism” as synonyms.  Id. 
 2. “Strong” originalists insist that the founding generation had substantive 
intentions about the way the Constitution was to be interpreted and applied, and 
this substantive intent can be determined by examining the voluminous literature, 
historical records, and ratification debates left to us by the framers.  At its extreme, 
“strong” originalism assumes that the framers anticipated or at least said 
something relevant about a wide range of modern policy issues.  “Those who 
framed the Constitution chose their words carefully . . . . The language they chose 
meant something.”  Edwin Meese III, The Attorney General’s View of the Supreme Court: 
Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intention, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 704 (1985).  Meese 
further wrote that: 
[T]he Founders believed [the judges] would not fail to regard the 
Constitution as ‘fundamental law’ and would ‘regulate their decisions’ by 
it . . . . The judges were expected to resist any political effort to depart 
from the literal provisions of the Constitution.  The text of the document 
and the original intention of those who framed it would be the judicial 
standard in giving effect to the Constitution.  
Id at 701.  Edwin Meese III, Matthew Spalding, and David F. Forte edited a book of 
short essays that purport to give the original meanings of each clause of the 
constitution.  THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION (Meese III et al. eds., 
2005).   
  A somewhat weaker, or less “pure,” form of originalism is described 
approvingly by Judge Bork: “What distinguishes interpretivism [or intentionalism] 
from its opposite is its insistence that the work of the political branches is to be 
invalidated only in accord with an inference whose starting point, whose 
underlying premise, is fairly discoverable in the [C]onstitution.”  Robert H. Bork, 
The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 826 
(1986) (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1–2 (1980)).  For a 
recent and comprehensive discussion of the history of originalism as a legal 
doctrine, see JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2005).  See also Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 
1113, 1164–1214 (2003); Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in 
Judicial Review, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269 (1997). 
 3. See Randy Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 
(1999); see also John Brigham, Original Intent and Other Cult Classics, GOOD SOC’Y, 
2002, at 13–17, available at http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~jbrigham/Original 
.html. 
2
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appeal to many Americans.”4  Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
thought it a fatal flaw that “[o]ne senses no . . . connection with a 
popularly adopted constituent act” among the opponents of the 
orginalist interpretive method.5   
The doctrine of originalism intuitively seems necessary to the 
rule of law, limited governance, and the avoidance of judicial 
decisions based on personal ideology, bias, or simple caprice.6  
Above all, originalism rests on the fundamental notion of a 
contract.  The existence of a contract reveals that at some point in 
the past, promises were made, limits were willingly agreed to, and a 
deal was struck.7  The contract compels us to accept that once 
made, we ought to keep our promises.8  Once accepted, we ought 
to obey the agreed-to limits.  A deal is a deal, and we ought to 
respect it even if, after the passage of time, it does not turn out as 
we expected.  These are the underlying principles of a contract. 
Associating the Constitution with these widely accepted 
principles allows originalism to ignore several practical problems 
with the doctrine.  The founding generation does not have a 
 
 4. Maltz, supra note 1, at 44.  Tim LaHaye, a minister, political activist, and 
co-author of the Left Behind series of Biblical prophecy novels writes that  
[t]he supreme issue of our day is whether or not we shall continue to 
allow unelected liberal judicial activists to make laws that were never in 
the minds of our Founding Fathers.  Shouldn’t these judges utilize 
judicial restraint and base their decisions on what the [C]onstitution 
means, leaving the lawmaking and constitutional changes up to Congress 
and the voters, through the constitutionally mandated process?   
Tim LaHaye, The Colossal Battle, ESQUIRE, Sept. 2004, at 179 (emphasis added). 
 5. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, in JUDGES ON 
JUDGING: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH 141, 144 (David M. O’Brien ed., 1997). 
 6. Glenn A. Phelps & John B. Gates, The Myth of Jurisprudence: Interpretive 
Theory in the Constitutional Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan, 31 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 567, 568 (1991).  The need to control otherwise uncontrollable 
judges is a major thrust behind the political advocacy of originalism.  See, e.g., 
ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 
(1990). 
 7. Among the synonyms for “contract” are words like promise, commitment, 
obligation, pact, pledge, vow, and “gave their word.”  James McElhaney, The Right 
Words, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2005, at 24–25. 
 8. A contract consists of a promise that is made in such a way that it creates a 
legally enforceable obligation.  See generally 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 2 (1999) 
(describing legal characterizations of contracts).  The positive law makes rules 
governing the kinds of promises that are legally enforceable and the ways in which 
they must be made.  Id.  However, the moral force of contract law, the feeling that 
it is right and proper for the government to compel their enforcement, is based 
on the moral obligation to keep promises.  See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS 
PROMISE 9–21 (1981). 
3
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singular voice.  Instead, the framers at the 1787 Convention, the 
kibitzers arguing in newspaper editorials, and the individuals 
responsible for the Constitution’s ratification sometimes said 
contradictory things.9  Consequently, difficulties arise in defining 
the deal and negotiations agreed to by the founding generation.  
Likewise, originalists are not able to identify which sources should 
be used to determine what these founding parties actually said10 or 
what was actually meant.11  
Supporters of originalism ignore other practical flaws.  The 
framers themselves “did not believe such an interpretive strategy to 
 
 9. Much of the surviving record comes from newspaper editorials.  
Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison tried to describe how the 
constitutionally created government would work and to explain why it would be an 
improvement while allaying fears about a devolution into tyranny.  The scope of 
the constitutional debate is illustrated by their eighty-five editorials collected as 
The Federalist.  ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JOHN JAY & JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST 
(George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) (1788).  Opponents of the 
Constitution replied with equally persuasive documents.  See, e.g., THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert Storing ed., 1981).  They quoted Locke as well as other 
philosophers and historians who commented on the proper scope and nature of 
government.  Ministers searched for relevant biblical passages, and businessmen 
must have pondered, as businessmen always do, what arrangements would be most 
favorable to businesses.  In letters, diaries, and journals, members of the founding 
generation communicated their questions, reservations, doubts, fears, and 
recriminations.  See generally DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 177 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976); Isaac Kramnick, The “Great National 
Discussion”: The Discourse of Politics in 1787, 45 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1988). 
 10. Cf. Kesevan & Paulsen, supra note 2 (discussing the interpretive 
significance of the limited records extant from the 1787 Constitutional 
Convention).  The authors explain that since the convention kept its proceedings 
secret, Madison’s notes and other records were not available to the ratifiers.  Id.  
Thus, the record reflects the intent of the drafters, but they can have no 
relationship to the intent of the larger group of ratifiers.   
 11. See Judith A. Baer, The Fruitless Search for Original Intent, in JUDGING THE 
CONSTITUTION: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON JUDICIAL LAWMAKING 49 (Michael W. McCann & 
Gerald Houseman eds., 1989); Ira C. Lupu, Textualism and Original Understanding: 
Time, the Supreme Court, and the Federalist, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1324 (1998) (on 
the changing attitudes toward The Federalist); H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for 
Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987).  In addition to the canonical and easily 
available writings of the founding generation, historians have brought to light an 
enormous mass of details that were previously unknown.  This material is arcane, 
unclear, and often contradictory, revealing, if anything, that the founders were 
themselves unsure of their purposes and often disagreed.  See JACK RAKOVE, 
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 1–22 (1990).  Originalists have been accused, with good reason, of 
radically oversimplifying this record.  DAVID A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, 
DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS 17 (2002); Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bork’s Grand Inquisition, 99 YALE 
L.J. 1419, 1423 (1990). 
4
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be appropriate.”12  There is no practical way to adjust the 
eighteenth-century concepts, even if they were precisely known, to 
the world of the twenty-first century, and trying to do so could lead 
to such limited choices for policymakers that it would give rise to 
bad government and bad law.13  Trying to consistently apply a single 
interpretive method, although superficially plausible and even 
attractive, is ultimately doomed to fail when it meets the complexity 
of the modern real world.14  Indeed, supporters of originalism have 
been accused of inconsistency and even incoherence,15 while the 
singular interpretive method has been labeled too facile, 
unworkable, and undesirable.16   
Originalists reply to such practical objections by retreating to 
even weaker versions of the theory.17  In weak forms of originalism, 
contemporary judges do not need to do exactly what the framers 
would have done.  They merely need to consider what the framers 
might have thought about some modern problem or to give some 
level of respect to the Constitution’s formation and some doctrinal 
 
 12. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. 
L. REV. 885, 885 (1985); see also Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for 
the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1089–95 (1989). 
 13. See Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intent in Constitutional 
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 237–57 (1988). 
But see Brigham, supra note 3, at 13–17 (observing that at least in its strong form, 
originalism “sets the heavy hand of the dead to control the choices of the living”). 
 14. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 11 (arguing that “foundationalism” will 
lead to “radical results”).  These critiques are purely practical in nature, and they 
demonstrate the difficulties in employing originalism and the undesirable 
consequences that may result.  But they do not counter the normative desirability 
of originalism that supports the need to keep promises and to live up to a deal 
once made.  Scholars have not presented clear reasons why we should refrain from 
framing constitutional questions with reference to the founders, why we should 
not at least try our best to determine what the founders agreed to, and why we 
should not consider ourselves bound by whatever glimmerings of original intent 
we can find.  Richard S. Kay shows how some of the practical objections to 
originalism can be rebutted and he makes clear that the preference for a single 
interpretive method is a value choice that cannot be rebutted by showing that the 
chosen method is impractical.  Kay, supra note 13.  For further discussion on the 
lack of a definitive principled rebuttal to originalism, see Maltz, supra note 1.  See 
also LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 137, 138 (1996). 
 15. J. D. Droddy, Originalist Justification and the Methodology of Unenumerated 
Rights, MICH. ST. L. REV. 809, 810–12 (1999). 
 16. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE NEW RIGHT AND THE CONSTITUTION: TURNING 
BACK THE LEGAL CLOCK 7 (1999); see also Brest, supra note 1. 
 17. But see Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1114, 1134–48 (tracing the 
history of this devolution and arguing that originalism is “a theory working itself 
pure” rather than an idea being watered down by its supporters to save it from its 
detractors). 
5
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effect to the motives of the people who staged its creation.  Thus, 
original intent has given way to “moderate originalism,”18 “original 
meaning,”19 “original public meaning,”20 “core meanings,”21 
“interpretive constitutional textuality,”22 and analogized “objectified 
intent.”23  At the very least, originalists can invoke the ghost of 
Churchill, who famously observed that democracy is a very bad 
form of government whose only redeeming virtue was that all the 
other forms were much worse, in order to argue that however 
much originalism falls short in practice, it remains the least-worst 
form of constitutional interpretation.24  As a result, originalism 
persists.   
In its weakened form, originalism may represent the dominant 
paradigm utilized by the judiciary.  It is capable of being stretched 
to any extreme.  American legal scholar Robert Bork claims to have 
found some original principle or intent placed into the 
Constitution by eighteenth-century slave owners that is consistent 
with our contemporary abhorrence of racism.25  He argues that the 
 
 18. Brest, supra note 1, at 222–23, 231–34. 
 19. See Barnett, supra note 3, at 611, 621.  Barnett eventually presents a weak 
form of originalism, which he argues meets most of the practical scholarly 
objections.  Id.  See also Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: 
Not as Radical as It Sounds (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 05-08, 
2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=714982. 
 20. Kesavan &  Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1146–47. 
 21. Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1, 26 (1971).  But see McConnell, supra note 2; Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and 
Original Meaning (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 119, 2006), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=925558. 
 22. DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER 
ORIGINALISM 120–21 (2005). 
 23. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 17 (1997). 
 24. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 
(1989) (“Having described what I consider the principal difficulties with the 
originalist and nonoriginalist approaches, I suppose I owe it to the listener to say 
which of the two evils I prefer.  It is originalism.”)  
 25. BORK, supra note 21, at 30–31.  If Robert Bork believes that the 
Constitution contains some tangible provisions that forbid slavery, it is because he 
is a decent person who cannot bring himself to believe that the Constitution does 
not share his abhorrence of slavery.  Indeed, Ronald Dworkin has argued that 
Bork’s approach is so loose that both liberal and conservative agendas could use 
the same arguments.  Ronald Dworkin, Bork’s Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 
658 (1990); see also Ronald Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 
13, 1987, at 3.  Dworkin himself illustrates this looseness of fit.  He finds only the 
most general and abstract principles in the Constitution, but uses them to cover 
specific recent cases.  RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985).  Thus, on 
the assumption that the founders meant to protect some minority interests from 
6
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founders neglected to specify who is entitled to equality within the 
Constitution, but they nonetheless adhered to a general, abstract 
principle requiring equality under the law.26  Furthermore, Bork 
argues that the founders would have made slavery yield to equality 
if they had known what we know about the evil effects of 
segregation.27   
These arguments are facially inconsistent with the forms of 
inequality dictated by the founders, including the notorious clause 
that labels individuals of certain races as counting as only three-
fifths of a person.28  Such arguments also show the length to which 
originalism can be stretched.  Bork contends that the flexibility and 
apparently infinite scope of originalism can be limited by finding 
the intent of the founders at a required level of generality and then 
requiring consistent application.29  But it is up to the interpreter, 
presumably a judge, to choose the proper level of generality.30   
Originalism represents the most dangerous kind of 
interpretation.  It invokes popular support by claiming to embrace 
aspects of the founders’ agreement while falsely purporting to be 
applied in a consistent manner.31  At the same time, the originalist 
method is so flexible that judges can use it to fulfill their whims and 
political ideology.  It is hard to imagine anything less likely to 
 
the tyranny of the majority, Dworkin generates a principle that forbids “appealing 
to the majority preferences about . . . what sort of lives their fellow citizens should 
lead.”  Id. at 68.  He applies this principle to conclude that the Constitution 
forbids laws that discriminate against homosexuals, calling it an “application of 
original intent.”  Id.   
 26. BORK, supra note 21, at 30–31.   
 27. Id. 
 28. Bernard Schwartz details the extremely tenuous rationalization needed 
for Bork and Meese to reconcile the views of the founders with contemporary 
notions of racial equality.  SCHWARTZ, supra note 16, at 22–25.  
 29. BORK, supra note 2. 
 30. Consequently, we must ask, on what principle can we conclude that an 
eighteenth-century white man would have believed that an abstract commitment 
to equality somehow trumped everything he had learned about the inferiority of 
other races, the need for slaves in the tobacco and cotton industries, or his own 
economic concerns?  And, on what principle of textual explication do we place a 
vague principle, perhaps dimly glimpsed in letters or editorials, above specific 
textual examples of inequality? 
 31. Research indicates that jurists who embrace the doctrine are hardly 
consistent in their application of it.  See generally Jason Czarnezki & William K. 
Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical Investigation of Legal Interpretation, 65 
MD. L. REV. 841 (2006); Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look at 
Originalism, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 113 (2002); Phelps & Gates, supra note 6; Joshua 
Ferguson et al., Behind the Mask of Method (Ohio State Pub. Law, Working Paper 
No. 41, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=800833. 
7
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protect us from the abuses of judicial supremacy.   
 Originalism should be rejected as an interpretive method not 
merely because it is impractical and will lead to bad public policy 
but simply because it is wrong.  It is inconsistent with the 
government that the Constitution creates.  It rests on a false 
analogy, a metaphor pushed too far.  The next section of this 
Article will investigate the nature of social contracts and the extent 
to which the Constitution can be categorized as a social contract.32  
The following sections will examine what our political ancestors 
thought they were doing as they created the Constitution33 and the 
ways that the Constitution has been used in the years since its 
ratification.34  Finally, it will be argued that originalism does not 
provide a suitable method for understanding the Constitution.35 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
 The social contract is a metaphor.  It solidifies the important 
principle that governmental power comes from the people and 
rests on the consent of the governed.  It leads to the important 
normative conclusion that because the people have given their 
consent to the existence and powers of the government, they have 
also created an obligation to obey it.  Political obligation, like a 
contractual obligation, is grounded in the promise to keep one’s 
word, to live up to the deals that were consented to, and to follow 
the accepted order of society.   
A. The Social Contract of Thomas Hobbes 
The central and defining moment for social contracts in 
modern history occurred in 1651 when Thomas Hobbes published 
his Leviathan.36  In a single, vivid piece of work, Leviathan 
 
 32. See infra Parts II, IV.A.3. 
 33. See infra Part III. 
 34. See infra Part IV. 
 35. See infra Parts IV.B.2, V.  
 36. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin Books 1985) 
(1651).  Scholars have traced the roots of the social contract back to antiquity and 
to biblical notions of covenant.  Sir Ernest Barker found ideas of the social 
contract in Plato’s Athens and during the Middle Ages.  Ernest Barker, Introduction 
to JOHN LOCKE, DAVID HUME & J. J. ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACT vii–xliv (Ernest 
Barker ed., Oxford University Press 1947) [hereinafter Barker Introduction].  The 
social contract was also a central figure of Richard Hooker’s 1594 text, The Laws of 
Ecclesiastical Polity.  See GEORGE H. SABINE & THOMAS L. THORSON, A HISTORY OF 
POLITICAL THEORY 408 (Hinsdale ed., Dryden Press 4th ed. 1973). 
8
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summarized previously published ideas about political obligation. 
The then-prevailing theories contended that people were obliged 
to obey the government because it was God’s will for the ruler to 
rule37 or because the ruler was viewed as having the same level of 
authority over society as a patriarch had over his family.38  The 
chaos and regime changes produced by the English civil wars, 
however, had made thoughtful people question the existing bases 
for political obligation.   
Thomas Hobbes provided an alternate basis for the public’s 
compulsion to obey the government beyond mere moral 
obligation.39  He offered a series of deductions based on the 
assumption that all people, at all times, are motivated by the same 
small number of drives, urges, and needs.40  When life is 
threatened, self-preservation is the strongest of motivations.41  
Indeed, Hobbes argued that this interest cannot be trumped by any 
other obligation.42  Short of a life-threatening situation, the 
strongest drive is the personal desire to exercise freedom of 
motion.43  In Hobbes’ colorful language, people are said to have an 
“appetite” to seek “delight” through movement, exertion and 
acquisition.44  In a natural state, without government or any other 
social organization, this movement inevitably brought each person 
into conflict with others who were similarly motivated.  Each person 
could respond violently to the attempts of others to place barriers 
on their freedom of movement, causing life in this natural state to 
 
 37. See generally MULFORD SIBLEY, POLITICAL IDEAS AND IDEOLOGIES: A HISTORY 
OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 316–17, 345, 372 (1970). 
 38. This was the position of Sir Robert Filmer’s Patriarchia, which John Locke 
ridiculed and demolished in his Treatises on Government, but it was also the position 
of Jean Bodin’s Six Livres de la Republique, which remains plausible and influential. 
See SABINE & THORSON, supra note 36, at 374–79 (1973).   
 39. When Hobbes based political obligation on the social contract, people 
who were used to relying on a divinely inspired moral obligation as the basis for 
compliance had no choice but to consider the now-commonplace idea that power 
comes from the people themselves.  Leviathan was widely read and it continues to 
fascinate because it proposed the idea, now universally accepted, that the 
government must be based on the consent of the governed.  See generally SIBLEY, 
supra note 37, at  292–93. 
 40. See HOBBES, supra note 36, at 81–83.  But see LEO STRAUSS, THE POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES: ITS BASIS AND ITS GENESIS 151 (1963). 
 41. “A Covenant not to defend my selfe from force, by force, is alwayes voyd.  
For (as I have shewed before) no man can transferre, or lay down his Right to save 
himselfe from death . . . .”  HOBBES, supra note 36, at 199. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. at 118–30.  
 44. Id. 
9
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be characterized as “the warre . . . of every man, against every 
man.”45  Life, in the natural state, would be “solitary, poore, nasty, 
brutish and short.”46  It is the worst state of existence imaginable. 
According to Hobbes, the drive for freedom yields at that 
point to the stronger drive for self-preservation.47  To end the war 
of “every man against every man,” people agreed to create an 
organization that could use compulsion to end the violence.48  
Hobbes defines this social contract: 
I Authorize and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this 
Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give 
up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like 
manner.  This done, the Multitude so united in one 
Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine, 
CIVITAS.  This is the Generation of that great 
LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that 
Mortall God, to which we owe under the Immortall God our 
peace and defence.49 
This agreement creates a sovereign, but the sovereign is not a party 
to the agreement.  It owes the citizens nothing.  The sovereign’s 
interest, however, like those agreeing to be bound, lies in 
preserving order and avoiding life-threatening violence.50   
 The sovereign can be expected to use the obedience of its 
subjects to stamp out any threat of violence or disorder.  It could 
issue draconian edicts coupled with brutal punishments to ensure 
compliance.51  By the terms of the agreement, the subjects are not 
only required to enforce these edicts, but it is in their interests to 
do so.  If an individual’s resistance is not punished it could lead to 
group rebellion.  If rebellion shakes the sovereign’s power, it 
threatens to propel the whole population back into the violent, 
natural state. 
Hobbes offers little evidence.  He only “models.”  From simple 
 
 45. Id. at 185. 
 46. Id. at 186. 
 47. Id. at 225–26. 
 48. Id. at 226–27. 
 49. Id. at 227. 
 50. See generally Claire Finkelstein, Hobbes and the Internal Point of View, 
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1211, 1227 (2006). 
 51. In a Hobbesian state, the torturer will be efficient and the executioner 
zealous.  See José Brunner, Modern Times: Law, Temporality and Happiness in Hobbes, 
Locke and Bentham, THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW, 2007, at 277, 282 (stating the 
belief uniformly held by Hobbes, Locke, and Benthan that the sovereign holds 
power over individuals based on its ability to instill the fear of punishment). 
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2007], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss4/1
5. LERMACK - RC.DOC 4/23/2007  10:52:09 AM 
2007] ORIGINALISM AS INTERPRETIVE METHOD 1413 
premises about human nature, he deduces that certain human 
responses are necessary and automatic.  The result is a bare 
schematic drawing.  The actors are one-dimensional, motivations 
are limited to a few hierarchical drives, and society consists only of 
the relations between the individuals and the sovereign, free from 
other human relationships including family, church, and voluntary 
organizations.  The sovereign gives orders and the subjects obey.  
No emotions of kindness or compassion are strong enough to 
overcome the drive for self-preservation that is embodied by the 
state.   
B. John Locke’s Natural Law and the Social Contract 
John Locke’s Second Treatise on Government52 is best viewed as a 
parallel theory meant to modify Hobbes’ model.  Locke offers a set 
of deductions, which reach a more benign conclusion about society 
because they are based on a more benign set of assumptions about 
the people who comprise it.  Locke relaxed the rigid assumption 
that the strength of human instinct prevents the person within its 
grip from fighting against it.53  Locke further argued that people 
were compassionate, sociable, and could see the dangers of 
unchecked conflict.54   
People are capable of perceiving and being guided by natural 
law.55 To Locke, natural law guarantees a bundle of inalienable 
rights, chiefly the right to acquire property.56  It also presents a set 
of normative prescriptions designed to maintain order and 
harmony, which is in everyone’s long-term interest.  Under natural 
law, people will order their behavior to avoid the destructive 
conflict that Hobbes thought was inevitable.  If some individual 
threatened the peace, the others would enforce it, for “every man 
has a right to punish the offender and be executioner of the law of 
nature.”57  Thus, the natural state would not be brutish or 
inherently unpleasant.  Nevertheless, it remains far from ideal.  
The natural state is marred by certain practical limitations.  
Impartial judges would not be available to adjudicate the inevitable 
 
 52.  JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (Peardon ed., Liberal 
Arts Press 1952) (1690).   
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. at 8.   
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property conflicts.  Ad hoc efforts to resolve these problems or acts 
of vigilantism do not provide an efficient response or alternative to 
governance.  People, therefore, create government by agreeing to 
obey a sovereign.  They give up their power to privately punish 
violators of natural law.  But that is all they give up.  People cannot 
bargain away their natural rights.  Indeed, the purpose of 
government is to protect these rights.58 
The social contract, therefore, creates only a limited obligation 
to obey.  As long as the sovereign governs in accordance with 
natural law, people must accept governmental action.  If the 
sovereign violates natural law, people are relieved of the obligation 
of obedience.  Indeed, Locke argued that people possess a natural 
right to rebel against a tyrannical government.59  Locke’s 
conclusions allowed the social contract to evolve and become 
associated with rights, limits on government, and the sense that the 
government may use brute force only in an exercise to achieve what 
is right and just.60  Locke turned the social contract into a powerful 
means of legitimizing the government.  Government must serve the 
people, so we are obliged to obey it.  If government does not serve 
the people, we can rebel.  The fact that we are not rebelling 
becomes evidence that the government has not become abusive.   
Eighteenth-century America was strongly influenced by 
Locke.61  The theory advanced by Locke’s Second Treatise on 
Government “was commonplace doctrine, everywhere to be met 
with.”62  Thomas Jefferson asserted that Locke’s arguments were 
“expressed in conversation, in letters, printed essays, or the 
elementary books of public right.”63  Along with Whig and Classical 
ideas about republican citizenship, Locke’s commentary was the 
intellectual furniture available to the founding generation.64 
 
 58. Id. at 70–72. 
 59. Id. at 123–25. 
 60. See Barker, supra note 36, at viii.  To the extent that all people have the 
same natural rights, social contract theory has also been used to justify the 
important principle of equality.  See RON REPLOGLE, RECOVERING THE SOCIAL 
CONTRACT 4 (1989). 
 61. See generally LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN 
INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION 5–6 
(1955); JEROME HUYLER, LOCKE IN AMERICA (1995). 
 62. CARL L. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY ON THE 
HISTORY OF IDEAS 79 (Vintage Books ed., 1970) (1922). 
 63. Id. 
 64. The prevailing view of contemporary historians is that although 
numerous concepts of what a republic should be like were circulating at the time 
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C. The Social Contract of Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
 The writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, including The Social 
Contract, are perhaps best remembered for rhapsodizing on the 
nobility of people living in a pastoral state of nature.65  Though 
Native Americans possessed very sophisticated governments of their 
own and were not living in a purely natural state, they fascinated 
the colonists who came to think of them as noble savages.66  
Rousseau saw the natural state and their presence within it as 
unstable and incomplete.67   
Though compassionate, people in a natural state could only 
pursue their own goals.68  They could not aid one another or even 
socialize because there was no society to create rules of 
socialization.69  Rousseau argued that the “noble savages” felt this 
lack.70  They yearned for society.71  They, therefore, created it, with 
each person giving up virtually all their natural rights to others.    
In this self-created society, each person retains only the right 
to equally participate in the making of necessary community 
decisions.72  For Rousseau, this participation is properly limited to 
helping the community discover, in each case, the one course of 
 
of the Revolution, these were all generally compatible in their insistence on 
limited government and participation.  See Lance Banning, Jeffersonian Ideology 
Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the New American Republic, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 1 
(1986); Kramnick, supra note 9, at 3–32. 
 65. E.g., JOHN LOCKE, DAVID HUME & J.J. ROUSSEAU, in SOCIAL CONTRACT 
(1947). 
 66. The portraits drawn by George Catlin and the descriptions of Native 
American customs offered by such diverse writers as James Fenimore Cooper and 
Francis Parkman illustrate America’s fascination with the vanishing Native 
American populations in the nineteenth century.  National Gallery of Art, http:// 
www.nga.gov/kids/catlin/catlin1.html (George Caitlin) (last visited Apr. 5, 2007); 
American Studies, University of Virginia, http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/ 
HNS/Indians/cooper.html (James Fenimore Cooper) (last visited Apr. 5, 2007); 
American Studies, University of Virginia, http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/ 
HNS/Indians/parkman.html (Francis Parkman) (last visited Apr. 5, 2007).  
 67. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in THE 
SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 199–234 (E. P. Dutton & Co. ed., G. D. H. Cole 
trans., 1950) (1974). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Rousseau discusses human nature and the need for society most 
extensively in the first part of A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality.  See id. at 177-
206. 
 71. Id. 
 72. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND 
DISCOURSES 13, 13–16, supra note 67. 
13
Lermack: The Constitution Is the Social Contract So It Must Be a Contract
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007
5. LERMACK - RC.DOC 4/23/2007  10:52:09 AM 
1416 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:4 
action that benefits the best interests of everyone in the long run.73  
To this general will, each citizen must sacrifice his own short-term 
interests and desires.74  Citizenship, therefore, requires a type of 
self-abnegation that is not called for in the natural state.  The act of 
creating and maintaining a civilized society creates citizens out of 
mere individuals.   
The sovereign in each community consisted of nothing more 
than citizens making important policy decisions.  Functionally, the 
sovereign consisted only of “us,” and there is no entity capable of 
exacting tyranny from which the people needed to be protected.  
Consequently, neither limits on governmental powers nor 
guarantees of rights are found in Rousseau’s system. 
Americans have never found Rousseau’s views on government 
congenial.  They tend to think of his descriptions of personal 
participation in small communities as sentimental at best, and at 
worst, as encouraging totalitarianism.75  Nevertheless, Rousseau’s 
acknowledgement of our natural inclination to be sociable and 
people’s ability to be transformed by social deeds is extremely 
insightful.  It insists that citizens can be shaped by public work.  
From this type of public or social work, the founding generation 
created the Constitution, as well as the identity of Americans and 
America as a nation.  
III.   FOUNDING DOCUMENTS 
The belief that the founders were responsible for creating 
something new and essentially different is a key part of the 
American colonial experience.  A new society was coming into 
being.  As the colonials moved throughout North America, which 
they saw as wilderness, they occasionally found themselves beyond 
the reach of familiar civil institutions.  In such cases, they came to 
think of themselves as being in a state of nature.   
As late as 1777, settlers in a then-isolated Vermont declared 
their independence from the organized colonies of New 
Hampshire.76  In language clearly echoing Thomas Jefferson’s more 
 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  Rousseau postulates that this general will always exists.  Id. 
 75. The debate over Rousseau’s compatibility with totalitarianism is 
summarized by R.A. LEIGH, Liberty and Authority in On Social Contract, in 
ROUSSEAU’S POLITICAL WRITINGS 232–44 (Alan Ritter & Julia Conway Bondanella 
eds., 1988) (1762).  
 76. DANIEL J. ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 32–33 (1988) 
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famous declaration, the settlers proclaimed, we “are at present 
without law or government, and may be truly said to be in a state of 
nature; consequently a right remains to the people of said Grants 
to form a government best suited to secure their property, well 
being and happiness.”77  The model for this claim, predating 
Locke, was the Mayflower Compact.78 
A. The Mayflower Compact 
Finding themselves on a ship beyond the reach of British 
authority, the Pilgrims looked into the face of the state of nature 
and recoiled.79  They believed that government was necessary to 
keep people from yielding to the depravity in their nature, and 
they knew that they would need leadership to deal with the harsh 
winter ahead.  On November 21, 1620, the Pilgrims formed 
themselves into a “civill body politick” and drafted a written 
agreement.80  They promised to obey civil officials when they 
enforced “such just and equal lawes, ordinances . . . as shall be 
thought most meet and convenient for the general good of the 
colony, unto which we promise all due submission and 
obedience.”81 
Significantly, the brief document does not detail the specifics 
of the government it created.  To the extent that the Mayflower 
Compact reveals the signers’ expectation that magistrates would 
govern justly and “for our better ordering and preservation,”82 the 
Mayflower Compact anticipates the limited agreements of Locke.  
The Mayflower Compact, however, is an open-ended foundation 
covenant83 without explicit limits or a written bill of rights, and it is 
more Hobbesian than the documents that followed. 
 
(quoting the settlers). 
 77. Id.  
 78. WILLIAM BRADFORD, MAYFLOWER COMPACT (1620).  
 79. Locke noted that history recorded many instances of people renouncing 
allegiance to an existing civil society and founding a new one from scratch.  
LOCKE, supra note 52, at 66.  He saw the phenomenon as evidence that obligation 
is not eternal or perpetual, but based on contract.  Id. 
 80. ANDREW M. SCOTT, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA 7 (1959) (quoting 
BRADFORD, supra note 78). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Contractual or covenant ideas pervaded the Puritan social thought of 
1701, which in turn served as a “seedbed” for many American ideas of liberty and 
democracy.  John Witte, Covenant Liberty in Puritan New England, in JURISPRUDENCE, 
POLITICAL THEORY AND POLITICAL THEOLOGY (Frederick S. Carney et al. eds., 2004). 
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B. Colonial Charters  
New governmental ventures customarily began with written 
authorizing documents.  Colonial charters served as grants of 
authority for the erection of governments and the foundation for 
institutions and written laws.84  The most famous of these charters, 
William Penn’s 1681 Charter for Pennsylvania, set rough 
boundaries authorizing the proprietor to transport colonists and to 
lay out towns and counties.85  The proprietor was authorized to 
appoint judges and other necessary officials to enforce criminal 
justice in all but the most serious cases and to make laws consistent 
with reason and not inconsistent with the laws of England, but only 
after gaining the “advice, assent and approbation of the Freemen” 
in a legislature.86 
Charters were issued unilaterally by the Royal Crown and 
could be, and frequently were, altered in the same way.87  They 
were scarcely negotiated.  Colonists, however, gained bargaining 
power as it became clear that the King needed them.  Only they 
could transform the unproductive wilderness into orderly, tax-
paying communities.  It was customary, therefore, for the charters 
to provide for limited self-government.88  At a minimum, colonies 
would have legislatures elected by freeholders.89  Later, an explicit 
bill of rights was added to some charters.  Pennsylvania’s Charter of 
Privileges guaranteed the freedom to participate in an elected 
legislature to all Christians who were living peaceably in the colony 
and guaranteed persons accused of crimes the right to trials in the 
“ordinary course of justice,” including the same “Privileges of 
Witness and Council as their Prosecutors.”90 
As the colonists saw it, the benefit of their obedience, 
 
 84. See generally, The Avalon Project, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/ 
states/statech.htm. 
 85. Pa. State Archives, The Charter to William Penn, March 4, 1681, 
http://www.docheritage.state.pa.us/documents/charter.asp. 
 86. Id.; see also CHARTER FOR THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA (1861), available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/pa01.htm. 
 87. In comparison, the colonists of Connecticut seemed to have organized 
themselves into a body politic first and then petitioned for a charter.  The Avalon 
Project, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/ct03.htm (including the 
Charter of Connecticut, 1662) (last visited Apr. 5, 2007). 
 88. See, e.g., CHARTER FOR THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 86. 
 89. See id.  
 90. CHARTER OF PRIVILEGES GRANTED BY WILLIAM PENN, ESQ. TO THE 
INHABITANTS OF PENNSYLVANIA AND TERRITORIES, OCTOBER 28, 1701, available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/pa07.htm.   
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diligence, and hard work was that the King would leave them alone 
to govern their internal affairs.  Many of the grievances listed in the 
1776 Declaration of Independence were violations of rights 
ostensibly guaranteed by the charters.91  The King was accused of 
dissolving representative assemblies when they disagreed with him, 
making them meet in inconvenient places, refusing to allow 
properly made laws to go into effect, and subjecting them to 
appointed civil and military authorities whose jurisdiction was 
“foreign to our Constitution, and unacknowledged by our Laws.”92  
The King was accused, in effect, of violating a contract implied by 
the charters.  He made himself a tyrant by “taking away our 
Charters, abolishing our most valuable Laws, and altering 
fundamentally the Forms of our Government.”93 
C. State Constitutions 
After the Declaration of Independence, many states revised or 
rewrote their charters into true constitutions.  These were often 
explicitly Lockean in their language.  For example, a 1780 draft 
composed by John Adams for Massachusetts stated: 
The body politic is formed by a voluntary association of 
individuals.  It is a social compact by which the whole 
people covenants with each citizen and each citizen with 
the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain 
laws for the common good.  It is the duty of the people, 
therefore, in framing a Constitution of Government, to 
provide for an equitable mode of making laws, as well as 
for an impartial interpretation and a faithful execution of 
them, that every man may, at all times, find his security in 
them.94 
Such state constitutions did not create government from a natural 
state.  Their most important function was to reauthorize existing 
governments by stating that their authority came directly from the 
people rather than the King.  To this extent, we can think of the 
state constitutions as authorizing documents. 
State constitutions often added explicit blueprints for 
 
 91. See, e.g., THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF, WEST NEW JERSEY, AGREED 
UPON - 1676, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/nj05.htm 
(providing an example of the rights created and guaranteed by colonial charters).   
 92. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 93. Id.  
 94. 8 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 237 (Gregg L. Lint et al. eds., 1989). 
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government institutions.  These blueprints depict the state’s varied 
choices, illustrating the overwhelming goal of limiting government 
power and preventing tyranny.  The “Plan or Frame for the 
Commonwealth or State of Pennsylvania” was genuinely innovative, 
though the structure it created was unwieldy.95  The freemen were 
to elect a House of Representatives whose members would serve 
two-year terms and were subject to term limits.96  An executive 
council would be chosen to represent the counties, and the terms 
of its members were to be staggered.97  Each year, the legislature 
and the executive council together would choose a president and a 
vice president, with the former exercising the enumerated powers 
of the governor with the assistance of the committee.98  The natural 
tendency was to rotate the presidency among the members of the 
committee, which would also rotate it among the counties.99  The 
council could outvote its president and thus control any descent 
into tyranny.100 
South Carolina’s Constitutional Convention constituted itself 
as a legislature.101  The General Assembly authorized the election 
from among its members of an upper house called the legislative 
council and authorized the council to elect a president and vice 
president who would have the powers formerly exercised by the 
royal governors.102  No separation of powers was provided.  The 
legislature could politically control any president.  In contrast, the 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 anticipated the United States 
Constitution, expecting safety to come from a conventional 
separation of powers and a careful enumeration of the powers of 
each branch, especially the executive.103   
In addition to the listing of powers and prohibitions,104 all the 
 




 96. PA. CONST. (1776), available at http://yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/ 
pa08. 
 97. Id. § 11. 
 98. Id. § 19. 
 99. See id. 
 100. Id.  
 101. S.C. CONST. arts. II, III (1776), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/ 
avalon/states/sc01.htm. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See 8 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 94, at 237–61. 
 104. Substantive provisions may also be placed in state constitutions in the 
form of limitations on powers.  Many states have limitations on taxation.  E.g., CAL. 
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state constitutions from this period provide a bill of rights.105  These 
were frequently lengthy and elaborate.  In fact, all the provisions of 
the 1791 federal Bill of Rights are anticipated in one or another of 
the state drafts.106  We can infer from the length of these 
documents, and from the fact that they are usually placed at the 
beginning of the state constitutions, that the protection of 
individual rights was a primary purpose of the government.107  
These state constitutions served as a blueprint for the objectives of 
the newly created government, the means by which officials would 
be selected, and the limitations on their powers.  When these 
details are added to the explicit authorizations, we can best 
describe the new state constitutions as founding or foundational 
documents. 
D. The Articles of Confederation  
The Articles of Confederation served as a founding document, 
differing from the others only in that its authority came from the 
states by delegation, rather than from the people directly.108  The 
national government it created was only to have necessary powers, 
which were to be understood as those powers that the states were 
willing to give up.  Though this national government was capable of 
certain achievements, it proved inadequate for the defense, 
economic, and regulatory challenges of the 1780s.109 
 
CONST. art. XIIIA;  ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 3.  These resemble the provisions in 
Article 1 of the United States Constitution forbidding taxes on exports and 
requiring direct taxes to be apportioned among the states.  U.S. CONST. art I.  
Maryland still forbids persons who belong to subversive organizations from 
holding any office or position of trust in state or local governments.  MD. CONST. 
art. XV, § 3.  Several states now forbid recognition within the state of any marriage 
except those contracted between one man and one woman.  E.g., KAN. CONST. art. 
XV, §16; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15.  Kansas long ago forbid the existence within the 
state of any lotteries.  KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 3. Various pro-gambling 
constituencies, however, have developed within the state.  Id. § 3A. (amending 
state constitution to permit bingo); Id. § 3B (allowing horse and dog racing);  Id.  
§ 3C (permitting a state-run lottery). 
 105. ELAZAR, supra note 76, at 111–12.  
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION (1777), available at http://www.us 
constitution.net/articles.html. 
 109. See MERRILL JENSEN, THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1964); 
FORREST MCDONALD, E PLURIBUS UNUM: THE FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC, 1776–90, at 7 (1975); CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 
(1966). 
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E. The United States Constitution 
The 1787 Constitutional Convention was convened to explore 
ways to fix the defects that had become apparent in the Articles of 
Confederation.110  Delegates revisited principles, discussing what 
they knew of the history of republican institutions111 in the context 
of what they had learned from Hobbes and Locke.  Then, the 
delegates made congress bicameral and strengthened its military 
and regulatory powers as part of an extensive list of enumerated 
powers; created an independent executive who could respond to 
emergencies quickly and who possessed significant military power; 
and provided for an independent judiciary.112 
The United States Constitution, drafted by the Convention, is 
extremely specific on details relating to the qualifications of 
officeholders, selection methods, powers, and procedures.  The 
delegates wrangled, in committees and on the floor, over the 
length of the President’s term,113 as well as the length and rotation 
period of a senator’s term.114  George Washington, the elected 
presiding officer, spoke from the floor only once during the 
Convention.115  He gave his opinion on the hotly debated 
representation formula for the House of Representatives.116  As to 
the legislators, the eventual draft is extremely specific, imposing 
age and residency requirements,117 identifying and sometimes 
limiting the legislature’s power to choose its leaders,118 and 
delineating quorum requirements, internal disciplinary powers, 
and lawmaking procedure including “presentment” to the 
executive.119  All of these details were debated.120  Each provision 
 
 110. For a general discussion of the Constitutional Convention, see ROSSITER, 
supra note 109.  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 97, 134, 493, 497 
(Max Farrand ed., 1966) (1911). 
 114. 1 id. at 23; 1 id. at 64, 289. 
 115. 2 id. at 97, 134, 493, 497. 
 116. 2 id. at 643–44.  A more comprehensive description of the issue is found 
in a document by James Wilson, 3 id at 159–60. 
 117. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. art I.  
 120. E.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 113, 
at 140, 155, 156, 245, 567, 592, 611 (on expulsion of members of congress); 2 id. at 
158, 231 (on choosing a speaker); Id. at 21 (on bill-passing procedures); 2 id. at 
181, 200, 298–302, 585–587 (on presentment).  The requirement that legislators 
be paid is part of the initial Virginia scheme.  But see 1 id. at 20.  Other innovations 
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was the product of thought and reflection.  Not a single procedural 
clause was adopted casually. 
Even more significant than the details governing each branch 
is the structure of the edifice as a whole.  All of the institutions are 
limited.  Government power comes from “we the people” who 
retain the Lockean right to take it back.  Each institution can 
exercise only its few enumerated powers, and each must obey 
various explicit limits.  The national government was created to 
establish a balance of power among the executive, legislative, and 
judicial components, which would politically limit their ability to 
oppress the people.  The Constitution includes other power-
controlling balances as well.  For example, within the legislature, 
there are two equal Houses, which must agree.121   
Individual rights, perhaps neglected in the 1787 draft, were 
added in near-absolute form in the Bill of Rights.122  The 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights, added in 1791, are either limiting 
or absolute substantive provisions.123  Political rights are expressed 
as limits on the kinds of laws congress can create.124  For example, 
the First Amendment declares, “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”125  Substantive 
clauses were partially included to meet political objections of 
groups whose opposition could imperil ratification.  Such details as 
the eminent domain clause,126 the protection of property under the 
due process clause,127 the right to hire counsel in criminal cases,128 
and even the protection of a free press129 probably respond to the 
 
were considered and rejected.  2 id. at 97, 102, 134 (term limits for the president); 
1 id. at 20 (term limits for the House of Representatives and recall of house 
members).   
 121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 122. Id. amends. I–X.  Cf. Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, in GARY L. 
MCDOWELL, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY 253, 254 (1981).  Slavery was 
abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.  Other 
substantive provisions have been added in the years since, the best known being 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s definition of citizenship and the Eighteenth 
Amendment’s imposition of prohibition on alcoholic beverages.  Id. amends. XIV, 
XVIII. 
 123. See U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.  
 124. The rights of criminally accused persons and the eminent domain clause, 
however, are expressed in positive language.  See id. amends. V, VI. 
 125. Id. amend. I.  
 126. Id. amend V. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. amend VI.  
 129. Id. amend. I. 
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concerns of the affluent.  
As the delegates debated, their conflicting substantive 
concerns130 were often remedied by structural responses.131  This is 
certainly true of the Constitution’s most explicit substantive 
concern, the protection of slavery.  The Constitution gave state 
legislators tools that they could use to prevent congressional 
interference with slavery.  The three-fifths compromise,132 the 
fugitive slave clause,133 and the ban on ending the importation of 
slaves before the year 1808134 are the most unambiguous provisions 
in the Constitution.  Only here does substance takes priority.   
The Constitution was innovative and controversial.  The 
ratification process was deliberately designed to encourage 
 
 130. Only a few clauses of the draft dealt with substantive details of public 
policy. Aware of the historical abuses of the law of treason in Europe to suppress 
political dissent or seize the property of the wealthy, the drafters defined treason 
very narrowly and required restrictive court procedures to prove it.  See id. art. III, 
§ 3.  The new government was responsible for the existing public debt and allaying 
the fears of bondholders and of state governments that Revolutionary War debt 
might be repudiated.  See id. art. VI, cl. 1.  Additionally, both the nation and the 
states are forbidden to interfere with the obligation of contracts.  Id. art. I, §§ 9–10 
(prohibiting ex post facto laws under Section 9 applying to the federal 
government provision and barring congressional authority to impair contracts at 
the state government level under Section 10). 
 131. Nearly half of the articles contained in The Federalist justify a structural 
feature of the proposed government. HAMILTON ET AL, supra note 9.  Six articles 
discuss the federal balance, confronting objections to lodging some powers in the 
federal government or to limiting it in some respect.  THE FEDERALIST No. 41 
(James Madison).  Thirty articles justify such structural features as the separation 
of powers, checks and balances, the ratio of representatives to citizens, 
qualifications required of representatives and the President, the novel method of 
choosing the President, the absence of term limits for the President, and the 
independence of the judiciary.  THE FEDERALIST Nos. 41–58 & 62–63 (James 
Madison), Nos. 59–61, 65–73, 78–79 & 82 (Alexander Hamilton); No. 64 (John 
Jay).  When the authors discuss substantive concerns, their arguments often revert 
to questions of structure or procedure.  James Madison’s tenth essay is well known 
for decrying the “violence of faction.”  THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).  
The political parties of Madison’s day were small groups of influential persons, 
including representatives, united in supporting some course of action not 
necessarily in the public interest.  If such a group could control a legislature, it 
would raise significant danger of tyranny.  Madison’s essay warned against this 
danger.  It also argued that the remedy was already at hand in the structure of the 
proposed government.  Id.  Madison argued that factions would not be able to 
work their mischief if there was just the right number of public-spirited 
representatives to oppose them.  Id.  The cure for the violence of factions, 
therefore, rested in the ratio of representation.  See U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 3 
(setting a maximum number of representatives at one per thirty thousand).   
 132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 133. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
 134. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
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participation and to make the consent of the governed overt and 
explicit.135  People debated and discussed the draft at great 
length.136  Referring to the constant conversation overheard in 
public places, Richard Butler wrote that “[t]he new Constitution 
for the United States seems now to engross the attention of all 
ranks.”137   
The memory of these public discussions quickly became the 
founding story of the new nation.  Indeed, if the Constitution is 
considered a national founding document, then the period of 
debate from 1787 to 1789 can be described as a founding moment.  
The Constitution is, in a sense, testimony to the fact that our 
country once did something as “The People.”  “[W]e are a people 
who constitute ourselves as a people in and through the terms of a 
fundamental text.”138   
Not long after ratification, politicians were talking about our 
sacred Constitution.139  It came to be an American symbol, like the 
American eagle or flag.140  It has become a repository of our ideals.  
Supreme Court Justice William Brennan explained, “The 
Constitution embodies the aspiration to social justice, 
brotherhood, and human dignity that brought this nation into 
being . . . . [W]e are an aspiring people, a people with faith in 
progress.  Our amended Constitution is the lodestar for our 
aspirations.”141 
IV.    CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
People do not always agree on what the Constitution means or, 
 
 135. See id. art. VII. 
 136. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 57–98 
(2006). 
 137. Letter from Richard Butler to William Irvine (Oct. 11, 1787), in 
2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 177, supra 
note 9. 
 138. GOLDFORD, supra note 22, at 16–17 (2005).  It is in this sense that James 
Madison called the Constitution “the cement of the union.”  MICHAEL KAMMEN, A 
MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 61 
(1986). 
 139. ELAZAR, supra note 76, at 124–77. 
 140. Today we preserve a vellum copy of the Constitution, battered and 
ancient, in the National Archives and Records Administration.  The U.S. 
Constitution Online, http://www.usconstitution.net/constpix.html#const (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2007).  It is displayed under climate-controlled conditions, and with 
great security, like the irreplaceable bones of some saint. 
 141. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary 
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 433 (1986). 
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indeed, even understand what it says, but they generally agree that 
the Constitution should be obeyed.  A 1997 survey commissioned 
by the National Constitution Center revealed that although 
respondents knew little about the specific details of the 
Constitution,  “[t]he vast majority of Americans fe[lt] that the 
Constitution is important to them, makes them proud, and is 
relevant to their daily lives.”142  Policy advocates, therefore, want the 
Constitution on their side.  They explain and justify their policy 
proposals in terms of what the Constitution allows or forbids, and 
their supporters and opponents argue over whether they are 
correct.  In America, the phrase “popular constitutionalism” has a 
tangible meaning.143  
As constitutional questions arise over congressional or private 
actions, the courts make the final determination about what is 
constitutionally permissible.144  Judges are called upon to use some 
interpretive method or principle independent of their own 
political backgrounds, political goals, or personal preferences.145  
After all, the “[C]onstitution is not an instrument for the 
realization of any political faction’s goals.”146  Rather, it is “a set of 
structures within which political factions can fairly compete.”147  In 
attempting to provide objective rulings and allow controversies to 
be fairly adjudicated, judges are ultimately responsible for creating 
 
 142. THE CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTION: MODERN INTERPRETATIONS 5 (2006); 
see also National Constitution Center, http://www.constitutioncenter.org/ 
CitizenAction/CivicResearchResults/NCCNationalPoll/TheAnswers.shtml (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2007) (containing archived survey data). 
 143. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2004), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/ 
mainpages/curriculum/colloquium/Larry%20Kramer.pdf. 
 144. Tradition, springing from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 
(1803), reveals that it is the province and duty of judges to “say what the law is.”  
When the Constitution becomes a source of litigation, it must be interpreted.  Its 
terms must be defined, implied powers must be inferred, and the language of the 
eighteenth century must be related to situations, problems, and policy options of 
today.  This is a vast task for the judicial branch.  Such judicial analysis inevitably 
considers the Constitution as a source of law.  Philip Bobbitt has argued that 
“[e]veryone agrees the Constitution is law.” PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION xiv (1991); see also JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES 
OF THE LAW 123–25 (Beacon Press, 1982) (1921) (explaining that it is up to judges 
to give the Constitution legal effect).  By its own terms, the Constitution is the 
highest source of law, trumping federal legislation and state-made law including 
state constitutions.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 145. Edwin Meese III, Politics and the Constitution, in POLITICS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF INTERPRETATION 53, 55 (1990). 
 146. Id. at 57. 
 147. Id. 
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or choosing an interpretive model for understanding and applying 
the Constitution.148 
A. Contractual Interpretation 
Originalists claim that the Constitution is analogous to other 
contracts.  Consequently, they argue that the Constitution should 
be interpreted in the same manner as other contracts: 
 [A] written constitution is like a trust agreement.  It 
specifies what powers the trustees are to have and it 
endows these agents with certain authority delegated by 
the settlor who created the trust. [I.e., the sovereign 
public, which created and imposed limits on the 
government.] 
 . . . . 
 . . .  Thus the methods hitherto used to construe deeds 
and wills and contracts and promissory notes, methods 
confined to the mundane subjects of the common law, 
became the methods of constitutional construction once 
the state itself was put under law.149 
Significantly, this is a lawyerly elaboration.   
 According to this argument, the Constitution is not just a deal 
that people make with one another.  Rather, it is analogous to a 
highly formalized kind of deal, specifically the trust agreement.  
The technical language of the law governs this form of agreement, 
where the parties receive formal titles such as trustee or testator, 
their intentions are reduced to boilerplate clauses with names, and 
the rights and duties they create can be specifically delineated.   
1. Formal Contracts 
Formal contracts are the kinds of contracts that lawyers are 
familiar with.  They are not ordinary agreements that people 
merely make with one another on their own, but rather a small 
fragment of agreements that become formalized when the parties 
consult their lawyers.  In shorthand, we can refer to these formal 
 
 148. A strong argument can be made, however, that any single interpretive 
method will always be inadequate.  Cf. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 11. 
 149. BOBBITT, supra note 144.  Compare with the comments of Justice Antonin 
Scalia in an address sponsored by the Federalist Society, “The Constitution is not a 
living organism, it is a legal document.  It says something and doesn’t say other 
things.”  Scalia Blasts Advocates of ‘Living Constitution,’ MSNBC, Feb. 14, 2006, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11346274.   
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contracts as lawyers’ contracts.  As sources of law, lawyers’ contracts 
have certain features.  They are made all at once, in a contractual 
moment signifying agreement, and the agreement is reduced to 
writing.  They specify each party’s rights and duties in relation to 
some promise or performance.150   
2. Relational Contracts 
Some formal contracts are relational.  These contracts try to fix 
the terms of some ongoing business relationship.  Typically, they 
try to preserve some mutually advantageous relationship into a 
relatively predictable future.151  The Constitution is closest in nature 
to relational contracts.  Just as a relational contract attempts to 
provide predictability into the future, the Constitution offered 
stable guidance to an evolving nation.   
 By making relational contracts, a business tries to make some 
ongoing activity reliable and controllable.  For example, a box 
manufacturing company can agree to deliver a certain gross of 
boxes to a trinket factory each Monday morning.  The trinket 
maker can then be reasonably certain of having the packing 
materials it needs to make its weekly shipments.  In exchange, the 
trinket maker agrees to pay the contract price on a regular basis.  
In addition, the relational contract could provide for various 
foreseeable future events by including contingent clauses.  If the 
trinket factory’s business increases, it can increase the number of 
boxes in its standing order by providing two weeks notice.  
Changing circumstances can be dealt with by various contract 
clauses defining the appropriate kind of notice and response.   
  The very reason that the parties make any lawyers’ contract is 
to project their intentions into the future.  Thus, the appropriate 
interpretive method is for the courts to enforce that original intent.  
“The primary and overriding purpose of contract law is to ascertain 
and give effect to the intentions of the parties, and the parties’ 
intent controls the interpretation of a contract as far as that may be 
 
 150. See 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 2 (1999) (describing legal characterizations of 
contracts). 
 151. See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 4 (1980) (defining a 
contract as “the relations among parties to the process of projecting exchange into 
the future”).  An employment contract is an example of a relational contract.  In 
an employment contract, the employee agrees to perform certain duties.  In 
exchange, the employer agrees to a certain salary and benefits.  The contract often 
anticipates a relationship of extended duration.   
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done consistently with legal principles, statutes, good morals, or 
public policy.”152  Traditional contracts are lengthy and technical 
because the lawyers who draft them believe that they have to sweat 
the details in order to ensure that the intent of the maker is 
properly captured.  This has long been understood.  In his 1833 
commentary on the Constitution, Justice Joseph Story explained, 
“The first and fundamental rule in the interpretation of all 
instruments is, to construe them according to the sense of the 
terms, and the intention of the parties.”153   
3. The Constitution as a Contract 
An analogy between contracts and social contracts may come 
easily to lawyers,154 but it is clearly erroneous when applied to the 
Constitution.  The analogy trivializes the Constitution, the symbol 
of our unity and the repository of our ideals, by reducing it to a 
mere instrument.  No one marches off to war or lays down their life 
for a promissory note.  It is even more demeaning to analogize the 
founding of our nation, our transforming moment, to the creation 
of a business contract intended only to insure dependable, future 
profits. 
 The very language of a lawyer’s contract may not be 
compatible with the expressions of the philosophers who gave us 
our basic ideas about social contracts.155  Hobbes, for example, 
 
 152. 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 308 (1999) (footnotes omitted). 
 153. COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES viii (3d ed.  
1858).  Indeed, interpretation may be defined as attempting to discern this 
original intent.  Lino A. Graglia, “Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 
STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1024 (1992). 
 154. Lawyers are tempted by the analogy because the word “contract” is used 
in both cases.  Also, legal education offers detailed descriptions about what 
lawyers’ contracts must include.  Significantly, Rousseau’s Contrat sociale ou Principes 
du droit politique is conventionally translated as Social Contract, but one translator 
translates the same term as Social Compact and another writes Social Pact.  THE 
SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES, supra note 72, at 13 (social compact); Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, On Social Contract or Principles of Political Right, in ROUSSEAU’S 
POLITICAL WRITINGS 84, 92 (1988) (social pact). 
 155. J. W. GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 5–6 (1936). 
“[T]o express political obligation in the legal terminology of contract is 
to use a legal analogy, and no doubt in some ways an unfortunate analogy 
. . . . Many [social contract theorists] were not lawyers but men of letters, 
or frankly pamphleteers, and we need not suppose that they always used 
these terms in the strictest legal senses.”)   
Id.  Locke’s limited social contract would seem at first glance to be an exception.  
His language is more legalistic than other social contract theorists.  In various 
places, he discusses such legal matters as wills and inheritances, and he often uses 
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distinguished ordinary business contracts from what he explicitly 
referred to as compacts or pacts.156  A contract is a “mutuall 
transferring of Right[s],” a reciprocal agreement to be bound.157  
Both sides agree to make a promise or perform some specified 
action for their mutual benefit.  The obligation is discharged when 
all of those actions are performed.158  In contrast, Hobbes’ 
compacts are perpetual and open-ended.  The subject matter is 
“alwayes something that falleth under deliberation . . . and is 
therefore alwayes understood as something to come.”159  Thus, even 
if people perform specified tasks, their obligation to obey the 
sovereign remains.  The obligation devolves to future 
generations.160  In such cases, something is going on that is well 
beyond the routine legal enforcement of lawyers’ contracts.   
 When we call popular sovereignty a social contract, “what we 
really mean is not that political obligation implies a contract so-
called, but that it involves a relationship which resembles or is 
analogous to a contract in some respects but not in others.”161  
Some overriding power provided for in the compact is vested in the 
deliberative and policymaking procedure of the sovereign.162  The 
 
legal metaphors.  LOCKE, supra note 52.  For example, when he discusses the ability 
of a citizen to renounce obligation to a government by leaving its territory, he 
analogizes this to abandoning real estate by sale or otherwise quitting it.  Id. at 69.  
But Locke’s language must be understood in the context of the late seventeenth 
century.  Locke’s intended audience used the word contract to refer to several 
different kinds of documents.  When Parliament accused King James II of 
breaking the “original contract between king and people” by leaving the country 
in 1688, it was referring to a tacit bargain more vague and open-ended than any 
lawyer’s contract.  See MARTYN P. THOMPSON, IDEAS OF CONTRACT IN THE AGE OF 
JOHN LOCKE 12 (1987). Similarly, the period’s writers distinguished between 
foundational contracts, moral contracts, and unbreakable, eternal “contracts 
before god.”  Id. at 40 (discussing the book ROBERT JENKIN, THE TITLE OF AN 
USURPER (1690)).  These are distinguishable from wills and promissory notes.  In 
context, Locke’s view of social contracts more closely resembles that of Hobbes.  It 
is similarly general, ongoing and open-ended. 
 156. HOBBES, supra note 36, at 192. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 193. 
 160. Id.  The fact that the obligation to obey is thus handed down, “which 
republican writers would never allow,” and persists even after regime changes have 
obliterated the original sovereign, is the major flaw which David Hume used to 
attack contract theory in 1752.  David Hume, Of the Original Contract, in HUME: 
THEORY OF POLITICS 193, 198 (1951). 
 161. GOUGH, supra note 155. 
 162. For Locke, this power is not absolute.  As Thomas Jefferson understood 
Locke, the power is very great and discretionary.  Only if the sovereign commits 
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compact imposes an ongoing obligation on behalf of the people 
even as it disregards some of their substantive intent.  The 
compact’s lack of reciprocity in obligation makes it unlike an 
ordinary contract.  For the purpose of legal interpretation, the 
social contract is simply not similar enough to the close-ended 
lawyers’ contract. 
Indeed, the varying perspectives of the constitutional 
generation do not lend themselves to the close-ended nature of the 
lawyers’ contract.  The people who negotiated, drafted, and ratified 
the Constitution had multiple policy goals.163  Some wanted to 
create a moral government, open to Christian religious influence; 
others had visions of ideal societies based on manufacturing, or 
even Biblical organizing principles; still, others sought the 
protection and perfection of natural rights, or a Lockean 
government in which the principles of the Declaration of 
Independence would be worked out.164  These goals, and others, 
conflicted.   
Moreover, to the extent that these were long-term goals, they 
could not be realized by mere contract clauses.  The solution 
provided by a social compact was to create a government open to 
influence where individuals could pursue these goals.  Once 
created, however, the government would be autonomous and not 
under the control of the framers.  Consequently, the framers paid 
attention to the structure of government, trying to maximize 
fairness and openness.165   
In this respect, contemporary state constitutions are typically, 
markedly different.  They are rich sources of substantive 
provisions.166  Education is the most ubiquitous example.  The 
 
wholesale violations of natural rights are the people justified in disregarding that 
prudence that makes it unwise to lightly dissolve the bonds of an established 
society and in resorting to their right of revolution. 
 163. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
 164. Id. 
 165. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: 
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962) (envisioning how a 
constitutional convention might work when parties try to maximize the chances of 
eventually reaching diverse and conflicting policy goals).  Attempts have been 
made to model the actual 1787 Convention.  See, e.g., Robert A. McGuire & Robert 
L. Ohsfeldt, An Economic Model of Voting Behavior over Specific Issues at the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787, 46 J. ECON. HIST. 79, 79–111 (1986); William H. 
Riker, The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, with Comments 
on Determinism and Rational Choice, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 1–16 (1984). 
 166. The substantive provisions of state constitutions range in purpose and 
scope.  For example, in Indiana, “the penal code shall be founded on the 
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Constitution of Illinois says that “[t]he state shall provide for an 
efficient system of high quality public educational institutions” that 
shall be free to the students.167  Other states have similar 
provisions.168  California required the legislature to provide funding 
for education in an amount not less than $180 per student each 
year.169  The state’s schools must also be open and funded for at 
least six months per year.170 
Similarly, many states are constitutionally required to manage, 
regulate, or conserve resources in the public interest.171  Illinois 
mandates the maintenance of a healthy environment.172  This may 
involve developing water resources in a controlled manner, 
protecting waterways from exploitative forms of commercial 
fishing,173 or instituting specific protections for hunting.174  Public 
utilities must also be managed.175 
 These examples indicate the difference between constitutions 
and contracts.  The substantive provisions of the state constitutions 
reflect public policy.  Different constituencies are either benefited 
or harmed by them, and they fight over them just as they fight over 
ordinary legislative policy.  Not surprisingly, state constitutions are 
frequently tinkered with, amended, or rewritten entirely.176  
Alabama, for example, has had six constitutions since it became a 
state.177  Changes to constitutions are proposed by legislatures, 
special convention, and lobbying efforts.178   In many states, these 
 
principles of reformation and not of vindictive justice.”  IND. CONST. art. I, § 18.  
Also, the Minnesota legislature is required to pay a bonus to veterans of the 
Vietnam and first Persian Gulf conflicts.  MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 8. 
 167. ILL. CONST. art X, § 1. 
 168. E.g., KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1; LA. CONST. art. VIII pmbl § 1;  MD. CONST. 
art. VIII, § 1; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; VA. CONST. art. 
VIII, § 1.  Some require the state to provide free textbooks to the students.  E.g., 
CAL. CONST. art IX, § 7.5 (for students in grades 1–8); VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 3. 
 169. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 6. 
 170. Id. art. IX, § 5. 
 171. E.g., LA. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 2. 
 172. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
 173. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. XA, XB. 
 174. E.g., MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 12; LA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
 175. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. XII.  Public utility management may be seen to 
include railroads.  TEX. CONST. art. X, § 2. 
 176. deTocqueville noted this tendency as long ago as 1830.  ALEXIS 
DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 249 (J.P. Mayer ed., Doubleday 1975) 
(1966). 
 177. An Overview of Alabama’s Six Constitutions, http://www.legislature.state. 
al.us/misc/history/constitutions/constitutions.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2007).  
 178. For example, the Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1970 has been 
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efforts are part of the ordinary political process.  These 
constitutions resemble relational contracts of medium-term 
duration.  By contrast, the United States Constitution has rarely 
been amended, and any attempt to change the wording is met with 
the attitude that it ought not be tinkered with lightly.  The 
government that it creates has endured longer than any such 
government.  Although it does things differently than it used to, its 
structured provisions remain little changed.   
 Even if we were to read the Constitution as nothing more 
than a promise that creates a legally enforceable obligation, it is 
clear that the Constitution creates a much different kind of 
obligation than is created by the ordinary lawyers’ contract.  The 
latter is an attempt to bring the future under the control of the 
present, while the former is an arrangement to create a polity 
capable of dealing with an evolving future.179   
B. Original Intent As An Interpretive Method 
Originalists do not see this distinction.180  Since the 
 
extensively studied by political scientists.  See generally IAN D. BURMAN, LOBBYING AT 
THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION (1970); ELMER GERTZ & JOSEPH P. PISCIOTTE, CHARTER 
FOR A NEW AGE: AN INSIDE VIEW OF THE SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION (1980); SAMUEL W. WITWER, CON CON DIARY: REFLECTIONS OF SAMUEL 
W. WITWER (1996). The delegates had to cope with high-pressure lobbying 
campaigns by, among others, downstate banks who wanted to preserve 
arrangements contained in the old Constitution that made it difficult for big-city 
banks to establish branches in small towns.  BURMAN, supra note 178.  The most 
effective lobbying was done by various elected and appointed public officials who 
had varying goals but were typically well organized and wielded considerable 
political power.  Id. 
 179. WILLIAM F. HARRIS II, THE INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION 1 (1993) (stating 
that the Constitution “narrates the polity into existence”).  A polity, by its nature, 
is the political expression and behavior of a group of people thus unified. 
 180. Robert Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEX. L. REV. 383, 385 
(1985).  Randy Barnett, who has probed the analogy most deeply, concedes its 
limitations.  Barnett, supra note 3, at 635.  Barnett proposes a novel theory that 
would justify at least limited originalism because he claims that it is the only 
interpretive method that will do justice, which he defines as protecting those 
natural rights that Locke argued people could not bargain away.  Id.  Such a 
government would be perceived as just.  Thus, people will accept it as legitimate.  
Since the creation of a legitimate government is the overriding goal of the 
Constitution, use of the originalist method maximizes the likelihood that the 
Constitution will be successful.  Randy E. Barnett, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY iv, v (2003).  Barnett does not argue 
that judges must use originalism because the Constitution is a contract.  He 
cannot, however, entirely avoid reliance on the metaphor.  In fact, Barnett has 
argued that “something like a parol evidence rule is needed to preserve the 
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Constitution requires proper, legal interpretation, they make the 
ratifiers of the Constitution and the newly created government the 
two parties to the Constitution’s agreement.  Fidelity to the original 
intent becomes the touchstone of all constitutional legitimacy.  
Former Attorney General Ed Meese III stated, “The Constitution 
represents the consent of the governed to the structures and 
powers of the government.  The Constitution is the fundamental 
will of the people; that is the reason the Constitution is the 
fundamental law.”181  To further clarify, “[i]f judges get their 
authority from the Constitution, and the Constitution gets its 
authority from the majority vote of the ratifiers, then the role of the 
judge is to carry out the will of the ratifiers.”182 
1. Framers’ Intent 
The framers of the Constitution are often presumed to have 
had specific intentions relevant to the substance of legal issues and 
disputes arising long after ratification.  In this respect, David 
Steinberg explored the roots of the Fourth Amendment.  He 
concludes that the Fourth Amendment was intended to focus 
strongly, if not solely, on searches of residences and real estate 
generally.183  This is the “original public meaning” originalism.  To 
support this conclusion, Steinberg relies on several historical 
arguments.  Initially, when members of Congress debated the text 
of the Fourth Amendment, their language gradually narrowed to 
focus on real estate.184  Additionally, a study of early analogous state 
law reveals a focus on residences.185  Although Steinberg stops short 
 
original meaning of the writing and enable it to fulfill the . . . clarification functions 
of formality.”  Barnett, supra note 3, at 630–31. 
 181. Ed Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited 
Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 465 (1986). 
 182. Farber, supra note 12.  U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia 
explained: 
[T]here really is nothing else . . . . The Constitution should be read like 
any other statute . . . . You either tell your judges, “Look, this is a law like 
all laws. Give it the meaning it had when it was adopted.”  Or you tell 
your judges, “Govern us . . . . You make these decisions for us.” 
Margaret Talbot, Supreme Confidence, NEW YORKER, Mar. 28, 2005, at 40 (quoting 
Justice Scalia).  
 183. David Steinberg, The Original Understanding of Unreasonable Searches and 
Seizures, 56  FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1061 (2004). 
 184. Id. at 1064–68.  Steinberg also argues that the British law of the period, 
including the controversies over John Wilkes’s case and the use of writs of 
assistance, focused on searches of residences.  Id.  
 185. Id. 
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of concluding that all cases applying the Fourth Amendment 
beyond residential searches are wrongly decided, he does argue 
that contemporary search and seizure doctrine is “incoherent” 
because courts have improperly stretched the boundaries of the 
Fourth Amendment.186  He further comments, “Justices may restore 
sensibility to Fourth Amendment analysis only by returning to the 
original understanding of the amendment.”187 
Rigorous adherence to this kind of analysis has fixed some 
policy preferences of the past eternally on the present.  For 
example, the United States Supreme Court has held that the 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in “suits at common law” 
applies to “the kinds of cases that ‘existed under the English 
common law when the amendment was adopted,’” or to “newly 
developed rights that can be analogized to what existed at that 
time.”188  But even a civil litigant’s right to a jury is not guaranteed 
“if one cannot find eighteenth century precedent for jury 
participation” in analogous cases.189  Some scholarly disputes exist 
over the historical basis for this ruling, but they do not critique the 
originalist approach.190   
Freezing the right to a jury trial, as it was defined in 1791, fixes 
the dead hand of the past on the living.191  This emphasis on legal 
history and the insistence that present-day legal issues can be 
resolved based on ratification-era thought is characteristic of the 
originalist approach.  It makes sense only on the assumption that 
the framers were wise enough to foresee and preemptively respond 
to problems that would surface today.   
If the job of a judge is to find and to give effect to the intent of the 
contracting parties, then good judges do so faithfully and bad 
judges do not.  “When [the Constitution’s] intent and meaning is 
discovered,” then “nothing remains but to execute the will of those 
who made it, in the best manner to effect the purposes 
intended.”192  In Sober as a Judge: The Supreme Court and Republican 
 
 186. Id. at 1077–79, 1083. 
 187. Id. at 1096.  
 188. Meese III et al. eds., supra note 2. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See Suja A. Thomas, The Seventh Amendment, Modern Procedures and the 
English Common Law, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 687, 690–91 (2004); see also Suja A. Thomas, 
Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 1 (2006). 
 191. Brigham, supra note 3, at 13. 
 192. SOBER AS A JUDGE: THE SUPREME COURT AND REPUBLICAN LIBERTY (Richard 
G. Stevens & Mathew Frank eds., 1999) (hereinafter “SOBER AS A JUDGE”).  The 
editors take their text from Justice William Johnson’s concurring opinion in 
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Liberty, the authors use the terms “restrained” and “sober” to refer 
to those Supreme Court Justices who ignored their own policy 
preferences and instead attempted to give effect to the original 
intent of the parties.193  The list of “sober” judges194 gives praise to 
those who think that fidelity to original intent takes precedence 
over a display of initiative, imagination, and independent 
intelligence that the judge might otherwise display.  Notably, the 
list excludes legal visionaries including Brennan the civil 
libertarian, republican-minded Holmes, or even the lawyerly and 
property-minded Taft. 
2. Rejecting the Originalist Interpretation 
 An originalist might respond that the inability to make the 
contract analogy exact and the bad effects that follow from 
applying originalism do not change the obligation to follow the 
method.  The Constitution, they might say, is a deal, an agreement 
between governors and the governed.  How else can a deal be 
interpreted except by looking to specific intent?  In fact, there are 
certain types of deals that are judicially interpreted and applied by 
courts with little, if any, attention to the specific intent of the 
parties that made them.  These deals are true civil contracts, not 
necessarily akin to ordinary lawyers’ contracts.  Perhaps the most 
extreme example is the marriage contract. 195 
 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 193. Id. at 20. 
 194. The list of “sober” judges excludes a series of concededly great legal 
scholars.  It also does not focus on courageous judges, like Marshall or Taney, who 
took personal risks. 
 195. Marriage contracts are not the same as prenuptial agreements.  See, e.g., 
Judith T. Younger, Antenuptial Agreements, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 697, 698–702 
(2001) (discussing the mechanics and policy of prenuptial agreements).  Lawyers 
draw up “prenups” to create a sphere of individual responsibility outside of a 
marriage itself.  Id.  Prospective spouses can agree, for example, that each of them 
will continue to be solely responsible for debts contracted before the marriage.  Id.  
Conversely, each can retain control of property acquired before the marriage.  Id.  
Personal property, they can agree, will not automatically convert into marital 
property.  Id.   
  A prenup can also provide for the orderly disposition of marital property 
in case the marriage fails, and it can provide an orderly plan for such things as 
alimony and child support that inevitably arise out of the detritus of a collapsed 
marriage.  The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, in effect in many states, lists a 
variety of property-related affairs about which prospective spouses may contract.  
E.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/4 (1999 & Supp. 2006).  These provisions 
generally deal with the “rights and obligations of each of the parties in any of the 
property [possessed before the marriage] of either of them” and with advance 
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A marriage contract is an agreement to create an association.196  
Though originally a religious ritual, marriage gradually became a 
secular, civil arrangement.197  It is now recognized as a true contract 
in which the parties agree to be bound and accept the legal 
obligation to remain bound to one another.198  “Marriage is a 
personal relations[hip] arising out of a civil contract between a 
man and a woman, to which the consent of the parties capable of 
making that contract is necessary.”199  The parties “contract towards 
each other obligations of mutual respect, fidelity and support.”200 
Marriage admits the parties to the status of married people 
with a corresponding position in society.  This position conveys 
significant, tangible economic benefits.201  Once a marriage is 
 
planning for dissolution decrees.  Id.  See also MINN. STAT. § 519.11 (2006).   
  Prenups rarely concern themselves with the marriage itself. Restrictions 
on the marital relationship are generally held unenforceable as tending to 
derogate or disrupt marriages and hence are considered counter to the public 
policy of encouraging stable unions.  See generally 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 245 (1999) 
(stating that agreements that include restrictions on marriage are contrary to 
public policy and are thus illegal and void).  For example, several states have held 
unenforceable premarital agreements not to have children.  Id. § 246.  In 
California, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a husband and wife cannot, by 
a contract with each other, alter their legal relations, except as to property.”  CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 1620 (2004 & Supp. 2007). 
 196. “The essence of marriage [is] the voluntary bargain struck between two 
parties who wanted to come together into an intimate association.”  JOHN WITTE, 
FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION AND LAW IN THE WESTERN 
TRADITION 10 (Don S. Browning & Ian S. Evison eds., Westminster John Knox 
Press 1997); cf. Thomas W. Joo, The Discourse of “Contract” and the Law of Marriage 
(U.C. Davis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 95, 2006) (explaining 
that by focusing on the voluntary aspect of the marriage contract, it is usually 
ignored that contract law often imposes obligations without consent). 
 197. See generally WITTE, supra note 196 (tracking the evolution of marriage in 
several Christian traditions); cf. SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS 
CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN 
IDEAS 149–54 (1901) (discussing the gradual evolution of marriage contracts in 
Roman law from religious rituals to something more like civil contracts). 
 198. In Missouri, for example, “[m]arriage is considered in law as a civil 
contract, to which the consent of the parties capable in law of contracting is 
essential.”  MO. ANN. STAT. § 451.010 (2004 & Supp. 2007); see generally MINN. STAT. 
§ 517.01 (2006). 
 199. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 300, 720. 
 200. Id. § 720.  In A Treatise of Spousals, or Matrimonial Contracts, written in 
London in about 1600, H. Swinburne observed, “A present and perfect consent 
alone maketh matrimony, without either public solemnization or carnal 
copulation, for neither is the one nor the other the essence of matrimony, but 
consent only.”  LAWRENCE STONE, THE ROAD TO DIVORCE 67 (1990).  These ideas 
led to the collapse of religious control of marriage in the western world.  Id.   
 201. Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance, Legal and Economic Benefits of 
Marriage, http://religioustolerance.org/mar_bene.htm (listing various legally 
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formed, society has some interest in preserving it.  It cannot be 
dissolved except by court action.202   
Like all civil contracts, marriage is regulated by the 
government.203  At a minimum, attention is given to the 
competence of the parties.204  Governments may require licensing, 
a showing of the ability of the husband to support a family, proof 
that neither party has a contagious or sexually transmitted disease, 
or any number of other specific details.205  Invariably, the marriage 
 
guaranteed rights and benefits of marriage) (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).  The 
benefits most likely to be unique to marriage, and not available by or difficult to 
protect by other forms of civil contract, include Social Security, Medicare, and 
veterans’ benefits; the presumption of inheritance of jointly owned property 
through the right of survivorship, thus avoiding probate; status of kinship for 
making decisions about the care of incompetents; and various tax breaks. 
 202. During some historical periods, divorce has been relatively difficult to 
obtain, requiring a public showing that one or both of the parties had breached 
the contract in some way.  At other times, during the late stages of the Roman 
Empire and in Islamic tradition, divorces have been easier to obtain for the 
husband.  Even in no-fault American states, where divorces can be had on the 
simple statements of the parties that the marriage has broken down, the 
dissolution of a marriage, with the concomitant untangling of finances, duties, and 
family ties, becomes an expensive and time consuming process. 
 203. At various times, initiating a marriage has been a complex process, 
involving negotiations over the formation of marital property, transactions among 
matchmakers and lawyers, and even consultations with shamans and soothsayers.  
Ancient contracts went into great detail about dowries and bride-prices, about 
where and in what conditions the husband and wife were to live, and even about 
how many children were to be raised.  In one Assyrian document from the 
nineteenth century B.C., the wife agrees that if she does not produce offspring, 
“she herself will purchase a slavewoman, and later on, after she has produced a 
child by him he may then dispose of her by sale wherever he pleases.” Alan 
Humm, Marriage and Divorce Documents from the Near East, http://ccat.sas.upenn. 
edu/humm/Topics/Contracts/marri02.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2007).  Notably, 
however, there is some ambiguity in the syntax, and it is not clear which woman 
can be disposed of by sale after the child is born.  Sloppy legal drafting, it seems, is 
not entirely a modern problem. 
  Western contracts were similarly complex during the early modern 
period.  For a discussion of early-modern European marriage contracts see MERRY 
S. WIESNER, WOMEN AND GENDER IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 37 (2d ed. 2005) and 
MARTHA HOWELL, THE MARRIAGE EXCHANGE: PROPERTY, SOCIAL PLACE AND GENDER 
IN CITIES OF THE LOW COUNTRIES (1998).  For an archive of eighteenth-century 
dowry contracts, see http://www.era.anthropology.ac.uk/ (follow “Ascoli” 
hyperlink; then follow “Continue looking at the Ascoli Project” hyperlink) and 
Humm, supra note 203 (archiving historical marriage contracts).  Insight can also 
be gleaned from fictional treatments of marriage.  See KATHERINE ELIZABETH 
JACOBS, MARRIAGE CONTRACTS FROM CHAUCER TO THE RENAISSANCE STAGE (2001). 
 204. MO. ANN. STAT. § 451.010 (2004 & Supp 2007); MINN. STAT. § 517.01 
(2006). 
 205. Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 197, 
221 (2006) (discussing public restrictions on marriage including disease 
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must be publicly proclaimed, which may be accomplished by 
conducting a commitment ceremony before witnesses.206 
Many marriage contracts are reduced to writing.  Positive law 
may require the writing,207 or it may simply be part of the tradition 
of a wedding ceremony.208  Beyond general vows, however, the 
intent of the parties is not recorded.  That is not to say that specific 
intent does not exist.  In some cases, marriage may be motivated by 
a desire to strongly improve one’s career, to create an entitlement 
to tangible benefits including better housing and tax benefits, or to 
establish a foundation for a family.  Some people have no intent 
other than to gain the status of a married person and whatever 
social world marriage will open up.  In these ways, marriage is 
transformative.  It turns bachelors and bachelorettes into husbands 
and wives, allowing them to behave, and even to think, in different 
ways. 
Sometimes the parties expect the marriage to produce very 
specific benefits.  The parties may have specific ideas about what 
sexual relations will be like, how housekeeping arrangements will 
be made, and how finances will be handled.  In plain English, the 
parties have expectations.  Their intentions are not typically 
enumerated, but there are exceptions.209 
 
regulations).  
 206. Some states require the solemnization of a marriage and the presence of 
witnesses.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 517.10 (2006).  In comparison, an eighteenth-
century A.D. provision of Byzantine law required a written contract specifying the 
wife’s dowry and three witnesses.  The Contract of Marriage, in the Ecloga of Leo III, in 
PAUL HALSALL, MEDIEVAL SOURCEBOOK: BYZANTINE MARRIAGE CONTRACT (1997), 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/byz-marr726.html (last visited Apr. 16, 
2007).   
 207. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 451.220 (2003 & Supp. 2007) (requiring writing if 
the status of property is altered by the marital agreement).  
 208. Marriage contracts create a general association expected to last “as long 
as you both shall live.”  Unlike business contracts, which try to control the future, 
marriage contracts do not typically provide many specifics.  Marriage contracts are 
universally understood to create sexual exclusivity.  The parties promise to forsake 
all others and cleave only to the spouse.  Even polygamous marriages control, to 
some extent, future permissible sexual partners.  Beyond this, most marriage vows 
are sparse and very general.  Both parties promise to love, honor, and cherish the 
other.  Although these words have dictionary meanings, they are used in many 
different contexts and are capable of such stretching that in practice, they are as 
vague as typical constitutional words like “due process of law.” 
 209.  In Islamic tradition, for example, where marriages are not treated like 
sacraments but instead more like other kinds of civil contracts, the parties are 
encouraged to add stipulations to the deal.  Beliefnet.com, Sample Stipulations for 
Marriage Contracts, http://www.beliefnet.com/story/73/story_7377_1.html (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2007) (listing sample stipulations that have or could be used).  
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Marital expectations cannot deal with the kinds of problems 
that inevitably arise in new marriages.  The counseling profession 
and the clergy invariably encourage all newlyweds to discuss 
finances, work arrangements, housekeeping, and the like before 
marriage.  Some do.  Some do not.  Regardless, the disruption that 
occurs whenever new associations are created guarantees that 
conflicts will arise even when the spouses are prepared.  As the poet 
Ogden Nash put it, “marriage is a legal and religious alliance 
entered into/ by a man who can’t sleep with the window shut/ and 
a woman who can’t sleep with the window open.”210 
Governments offer little support to parties who are trying to 
adjust to marriage.  Although they extensively regulate marriages, 
they initially did so in pursuit of public, as opposed to marital 
goals.211  Over time, the strengths of the various public interests 
have waxed and waned.212  Government regulation of marriage has 
correspondingly altered.213  For example, nineteenth-century 
 
These may include the husband’s promises to employ a maid, to learn to speak 
and read Arabic, to share home management including child care and cleaning 
whether or not the wife works outside the home, to not beat the spouse or the 
children, and to discuss finances openly.  Id.  The wife may reserve the right to 
come and go as she pleases, to work outside the home, provided the husband has 
a veto over the choice of a job, to retain some property of her own, to visit her 
parents whenever she chooses, and to divorce the husband on favorable financial 
terms if he brings another wife into the home.  Id.  The wife may promise that she 
will not become pregnant until the husband, or both spouses, complete some level 
of education.  Id.  She may insist, and the husband must agree, to allow her to 
bring “all twenty of her cats to live in her husband’s house.”  Id.  But see FEMINIST 
SEXUAL ETHICS PROJECT, Marriage Contracts in Islamic Jurisprudence, http://www. 
brandeis.edu/projects/fse/Pages/marriagecontracts.html (last visited Mar. 21, 
2007). 
 210. OGDEN NASH, I DO, I WILL, I HAVE (1949), available at http://www.aenet. 
org/poems/ognash8.htm. 
 211. Teitlebaum, supra note 205.  For a variety of public health and eugenic 
reasons, states may prohibit marriages between close relatives or people with 
sexually transmitted diseases, and they may forbid legally incompetent persons to 
marry entirely.  Id.  Because the government has an interest in sexual morality, and 
because its general interest in encouraging stable marriages is threatened by 
infidelity, it may forbid adultery or bigamy.  See id.  For similar reasons, and 
because governments retain some interest in the welfare of children, states forbid 
cruelty or neglect of dependents in marriage and require school attendance, 
immunization, and sometimes sequestration of the individual property of 
children.  Id.  Finally, states may make it easier or harder to divorce and may retain 
some control over the “disposition” of children after a divorce.  Id. 
 212. For example, the government’s interest in private sexual morality. 
 213. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES: FAMILIES, INDIVIDUALS AND THE LAW 
44–47 (2004).  Harald Fuess has recently argued that similar changes occurred in 
nineteenth-century Japanese society.  HARALD FUESS, DIVORCE IN JAPAN: FAMILY, 
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notions of racial purity, once popular, fell into disrepute during the 
twentieth century.  Laws that prohibited cohabitation and marriage 
between people of different races were gradually repealed or struck 
down.214  Still, the government enforces regulations for its own 
purposes.   
Courts will not enforce the specific intent of the couple when 
it is called upon to adjudicate issues within the marital relationship.  
For example, the court cannot be petitioned to resolve a husband’s 
complaint regarding the lack of sexual affection in the marriage, 
and a wife’s disapproval that her husband is not doing his share of 
the housework will likewise be unavailing.  There is a presumption 
that the intimate details of any marriage are, or should be private, 
and that they should not be discussed in a public forum.215  It is 
believed that exposing the intimate details of a marriage to public 
scrutiny tends to weaken the marriage and, thus, is contrary to the 
public policy of encouraging strong marriages.216  When spouses 
cannot achieve their specific goals on their own and the courts 
refuse to interfere, the relationship may break down entirely, 
resulting in divorce.  Ironically, divorce inevitably requires some 
level of governmental response.  Divorce, however, is not an 
improvement or correction to a relationship.  It is the obliteration 
of a marriage.   
 
GENDER AND THE STATE (2004). 
 214. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (cohabitation); 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage).  In California, no marriage 
regulation may ever require that an applicant state his or her race or color “for any 
purpose.”  CAL. FAM. CODE § 354(d) (2004).  Similarly, most states have now 
repealed requirements that the parties obtain blood tests to detect sexually 
transmitted diseases before marriage licenses could be issued.  See generally U.S. 
Marriage Laws, http://usmarriagelaws.com (collecting state licensing 
requirements). 
 215. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965), the Court forbid 
states from inquiring into decisions to use birth control: 
Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital 
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?  The very idea is 
repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.  We 
deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our 
political parties, older than our school system.  Marriage is a coming 
together for better or worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the 
degree of being sacred. 
Id. (emphasis added).  See also CAL. FAM. CODE § 162. 
 216. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.4 (3d ed. 1999) 
(stating that contract provisions counter to public policy will not be enforced by 
civil courts); see also JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO 
ON CONTRACTS 2, 19 (3d ed. 1987). 
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In this way, a marriage contract is the counter-example to the 
insistence that the enforcement of a contract requires a court to 
put into effect the specific intent of the parties.  The box company 
can invoke the assistance of a court in making the contractual 
relationship what the makers intended it to be while the unhappy 
spouse is left to his or her own devices.   Courts can regulate the 
marital relationship, but they do so in ways that have everything to 
do with the public interest and little to do with the specific 
intentions of the husband and wife.217   
The United States Constitution is much more like a marriage 
contract than it is like an ordinary contract such as a promissory 
note, deed, or will.  It is a foundation document that establishes an 
open-ended association and transforms its parties in relation to that 
association.  Accordingly, it may be possible to take one more step 
and argue that because the Constitution functionally creates a 
marriage, it must be interpreted in courts as though it were a 
marriage contract.  But that argument merely repeats the mistake 
of the originalists who over-generalize from the metaphor. 
In many respects, however, the Constitution is different from a 
marriage contract.  That is the point.  The Constitution is unique.  
It is a document, but it also houses ideas and our national spirit.  As 
an idea, it is also a symbol to which people attach loyalty and 
patriotism.  The Constitution is not just a symbol, like the flag.   It is 
to be applied in courts according to its hierarchical status as the 
“supreme” source of law.218  Nevertheless, it is not just a legal 
 
 217. Since no argument is ever truly new, it is not surprising that at least once 
before a writer has resorted to the marriage metaphor to suggest the proper 
interpretation of a foundation contract.  In his exploration of what Locke’s 
contemporaries understood when the word contract was used in political 
discourse, Martyn P. Thompson discusses the work of Robert Jenkin, a long-
forgotten Jacobite pamphleteer.  See THOMPSON, supra note 155, at 40  (discussing 
ROBERT JENKIN, THE TITLE OF A USURPER AFTER A THOROUGH SETTLEMENT 
EXAMINED, IN ANSWER TO DR. SHERLOCK’S CASE OF ALLEGIANCE (1690)).  After 
Parliament decided, in 1688, that Catholic King James II had broken the original 
contract of government by fleeing the country, Jenkin tried to show that King 
James remained the legal King because the contract could not be broken.  Id.  He 
argued that unlike ordinary contracts the original contract was made “before god” 
and it was like a marriage in being solemnized.  Id.  Therefore, like a marriage it 
could never be broken.  Jenkin used the analogy to argue, as here, that there are 
different kinds of contracts.  But his specifically Catholic view of marriage probably 
failed to convince the great majority of English citizens, whose Protestant political 
consciousness included the divorces of Henry VIII.   
 218. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution declares that 
“[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land.”  U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
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document.  No method of interpretation is complete unless all the 
various facets of the Constitution are considered. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Courts must give the Constitution a legal effect, so their 
decisions are partial.  They deal with immediate details, not broad 
generalities.  That does not mean that their decisions must follow 
the framers’ original intent.  Originalists argue that no great 
mischief comes from pursuing the intent of the framers and that 
some good may come of the exercise.  In this view, if judges limit 
their decisions to enforcing original intent, they are enforcing a 
sort of self-restraint.  This will keep them from distorting the law 
with their own policy preferences.219  To this argument, two replies 
may be given.  First, adherence, or at least lip service, to originalism 
has not prevented considerable distortion.220  Second, relationships 
necessarily evolve.221  The parties must necessarily be allowed to 
 
 219. BORK, supra note 6; Richard G. Stevens, Introduction to SOBER AS A JUDGE, 
supra note 192, at 1–24. The notion that only judges can save our ancient liberties, 
by saving them from themselves, has been the originalists’ political battle cry.  Id.  
 220. See supra, Part IV.B.3 (discussing the evolving nature of the marital 
relationship).   
 221. This argument may be difficult to place in its legal context.  The marriage 
contract metaphor may suggest a way to grasp it.  For we may ask again, why do 
courts refuse to enforce specific intent within marriages?  Surely the reason is that 
relationships necessarily evolve, and the decision-making structure that evolves 
within any marriage is intimately connected with the task of planning for, or 
adapting quickly to, unforeseen change.  Change may come from within the 
parties themselves as they age.  For example, sexual appetites naturally wane or are 
transformed, infirmities and unplanned diseases interfere with a spouse’s ability to 
perform chores or provide economic support, and new interests develop while old 
attachments fade.  The metaphor reminds us that it is the working out of the 
change through intimate discussions that is the very heart of the marriage 
relationship. Change may also come from changing circumstances.  Children 
arrive and make their own demands on time and finances.  Relatives may make 
still other demands.  Fortune smiles, or perhaps richer becomes poorer.   
  Finally, change can be the result of adaptation to changes in the larger 
world.  The 1960s encouraged greater social experimentation, while political and 
financial changes in the 1970s made it necessary for more women to secure jobs 
outside middle-class households. Had courts enforced the specific intent of 
newlyweds of 1955 on families of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, it might have frozen 
marriages and prevented any evolution at all.  The new middle-class husband of 
1955 was proud that his wife did not need to work outside of the home.  It 
reflected well on his ability to “provide.”  If that intent had been enforced when 
the economy weakened after 1970, then that marriage may have fallen on 
disastrously hard times.  Something even worse would have occurred.  The court 
would have substituted itself, and a mechanical rule, for the process of intimate 
decision making that would have made it possible for the marriage to adapt. 
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respond to changed intentions, perspectives, and circumstances.  
The nation must also be allowed to adapt to changes in the larger 
world. 
Originalism is simply the wrong interpretive method to use for 
a document that creates a participatory government designed to 
respond to and deal with change.  Originalism looks to the past 
when courts should be contemplating the future.  It stiffens what 
should be flexible and substitutes a process of judicial archaeology 
for the kind of vigorous public debate embraced during the 
Constitution’s ratification.   
The need for flexibility in facing unplanned and unexpected 
change is the most significant argument in favor of an adaptive or 
evolutionary method of interpreting the Constitution.  Some of the 
founders seem to have been aware of this.  Chief Justice John 
Marshall explained in McCulloch v. Maryland:222 
[The Constitution is] intended to endure for ages to 
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various 
crises of human affairs.  To have prescribed the means by 
which government should, in all future time, execute its 
powers, would have been to change, entirely, the 
character of the instrument, and give it the properties of a 
legal code.  It would have been an unwise attempt to 
provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if 
foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can 
best be provided for as they occur.223 
The founders understood that much of their work from 1787 
to 1789 was driven by immediate political need.  Many of the 
framers eschewed the original intent approach.224  Thomas 
Jefferson warned against attributing to the people of the past a 
wisdom more than human.225 
No form of interpretation can be legitimate unless it gives 
 
 222. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 223. Id. at 415. 
 224. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text. 
 225. See RAKOVE, supra note 11, at 367 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson 
to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 40 (1903)).  
Even so, in the course of our public dialogue regarding the scope and proper 
application of the Constitution, we should still review certain artifacts of the 
founding generation.  We should review these artifacts not because we must be 
bound by the original intent but because they offer valuable insight.  As Jack 
Rakove suggests, “the meditations about popular government that we encounter 
there remain more profound than those that the ordinary politics of our endless 
democratic present usually sustain.”  Id. at 368. 
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effect to the overriding intent of the founders to create a 
participatory government.226  The government cannot be 
understood without reference to the citizenry to which it is linked.  
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer has written that the 
Constitution is basically “a set of detailed provisions designed to 
create democratic political institutions that will last . . . . A 
participatory democracy that has those attributes is really what the 
Constitution is trying to create.”227   
The people need to address the exigencies that arise through 
discussions on an individual basis and with their elected 
representatives.228  Additionally, judicial review “forces a 
conversation within the polity about what the Constitution should 
mean.”229  This serves a useful function.  The dialogue initiated by a 
court case can lead to changes in public opinion, backlash, explicit 







 226. HARRIS, supra note 179 (stating that the Constitution “narrates the polity 
into existence”). 
 227. Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections of a Junior Justice, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 7, 12–13 
(2005); see also STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 17–35 (2006) (explaining the need for Justices to look at cases in 
light of how their decisions will promote the Constitution’s aim of promoting 
participation by citizens in the processes of government, or what Justice Breyer 
calls “active liberty”). 
 228. See Meese, supra note 145, at 53, 57 (1990) (explaining that the 
Constitution offers a set of structures within which political factions can fairly 
compete).  
 229. Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function of 
Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1259 (2004). 
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